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ABSTRACT The Turkana, pastoralists in northern Kenya, have a strong tendency to regard
any social interactions as negotiable. In their negotiations, they cope with the difficulties of
arriving at a mutual agreement by desperately clinging to the principle of sustaining a “coop-
erative present” while employing various tactics in an attempt to secure their own benefit.
When participants in some communication take the attitude that they will focus on the “coop-
erative present,” they abandon any possibility of taking a negative option in the communica-
tion, such as pretending to be unconcerned or straightforwardly rejecting a demand. After
initiating a negotiation, they cannot help but realize some form of a positive relationship
sooner or later, although this framework doesn’t decisively affect the consequence of negotia-
tion, as is implied by the possibility that the negotiation might be prolonged indefinitely.
They never intend to make agreement by depending on an outside standard of justice, but
they attempt to establish a standard of justice guided by ‘my’ activeness and thus effectively
produce a state representing ‘my’ justice inside the communication.
Key Words: Communication; Negotiation; Relationship; Turkana; Cooperative present.
EXPERIENCE AT THE “COOPERATIVE PRESENT”
In previous studies, I have taken the approach that in order to understand the
“body” in the process of communication, it is necessary to first examine the phe-
nomenon of physical resonance, synchrony or propagation (Kitamura, 1983; 1989;
1990a; 1990b; 1992). I have long been fascinated with the phenomenon of touching,
laughing, and greeting in such forms as when two parties simultaneously undertake
the same action. With such an approach, I have been concerned with the question of
“What constitutes communication?” followed closely by consideration of the bodily
foundation.
Why should “bodily communication,” defined herein as communication among
individuals physically confronting others, be considered important? While this may
lack a clear answer, I would like to present my own answer, and develop the ensuing
discussion from the standpoint of justifying my answer.
“Bodily communication” is a privileged activity in which we achieve real experi-
ences in the present tense and which is the source of a realistic understanding of our
world. We need such a realistic understanding for positively sustaining our own
existence. While a lengthy discussion is required in order to describe the experience
in the present tense precisely, I will herein simply sketch my thoughts pertaining to
this.
Although we feel no uneasiness when staring at something as object, we do feel
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embarrassment when staring at another person or making direct eye contact with
another. Such eye contact is fundamentally different from objectively watching
something or someone. Washida (1990) extensively analyzed this phenomena in his
discussion of the phenomenology of “face,” saying:
In the situation of physically confronting others, I am prohibited from retiring to my
own immanent stream of experience from present to past, and dragged to a “coopera-
tive present” in which the future remains unknown, and forced to be continuously
exposed to this “present.”  The words and expression which I cannot sufficiently con-
trol inevitably draw unforeseen words from others and induce in them, expressions that
they themselves are unconscious of. Further, I must react to the responses of others. In
this way, myself and the others are anchored at a common present, and engage with,
intersect with, and synchronize with each other at that “cooperative present.”
The experience in the present tense is, in Washida’s words, an experience at a
“cooperative present,” which is sustained by mutual interaction. Washida refers to
its significance by emphasizing the passive experience of perceiving the others’
examination of oneself.  Ignoring this passiveness means taking a stand of perceiv-
ing elements of the external world as objects and merely manipulating them. At that
time, the experience becomes enmeshed in future events, the manipulation of which
are ideally organized to benefit me. In other words, the experience becomes shad-
owed by threats and fears from the future.
On the other hand, we cannot ignore the aspect of activeness on ‘my’ side, though
it is also important to point out that a passiveness on ‘my’ side corresponds to an
activeness on the others’ side. ‘I’ must perceive the others’ activeness but at the
same time, must not retreat to ‘my’ passiveness. Rather, I must expose ‘my’ active-
ness at that time and place, whether ‘I’ like it or not. Evacuation to ‘my’ passiveness
in this case could signify obedience to power, or subordination to the preceding, in
other words, past rules and norms. Expressing this in my own words, experience at
“cooperative present” occurs when ‘I’, together with others, become gracefully
intertwined as mutually active actors.
I, however, would not like to say that this kind of experience is so valuable in and
of itself that we should continuously endeavor to obtain it. The cooperative present
and bodily communication can be rather mundane. The reason why these phenom-
ena should be critically examined is that in a highly industrialized society, this kind
of communication is thought of totally unrelated to the steady domains of the main-
stream, and are, in the least sense, activities of leisure recreation and, at most, activi-
ties preserved for briefly retrieving our lost humanness. This kind of communication
cannot be thought of as an activity which adults, especially adult males, seriously
concern themselves with.
However, from my own standpoint, it is important to make clear how this “mun-
dane activity” is related to the steady domains of mainstream life, those activities
which maintain social order and secure personal benefit. I cannot, of course, develop
this entire discussion here, but would like to investigate clues to its nature.
I will approach this problem by way of analyzing examples observed among the
Turkana people, pastoralists in northern Kenya, whom I have studied since 1986. I
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will focus on the aspect of “negotiation” in their social interaction. Negotiation is, as
a matter of course, a social interaction related directly to activities in which each
individual attempts to secure his own benefit and also to make agreement with oth-
ers. Among the Turkana, this kind of social interaction is always conducted within
the framework of “bodily communication.”
The Turkana cope with the difficulties of arriving at a mutual agreement in their
negotiations by desperately clinging to the principle of sustaining a “cooperative
present” while employing various tactics in an attempt to secure their own benefit.
Analyzing concrete examples, I would like to develop discussion along this under-
standing.
“NEGOTIATION” AMONG THE TURKANA
At the risk of oversimplifying the case and thereby creating misunderstanding, let
me begin by stating that the Turkana are fond of negotiation. Elaborating, they
regard any social interactions as negotiable and have a strong tendency to create a
competitive situation by orienting their choice in any interaction with others  to their
own advantages and disadvantages.
Every foreigner who has lived among the Turkana point out their persistent and
frequent “begging” as the most impressive experience. Such begging, herein termed
“demands,” are a frequent occurrence and take place in a variety of situations. Of
course, the side “demanded” (as opposed to “demander”) attempts to refuse the
demand as it is impossible to yield and give into every demand on every occasion.
This results in Turkana negotiation. Moreover, the demander doesn’t merely state
the demand in an ambivalent manner, abandoning it upon refusal, but rather
becomes more persistent unless the demanded can skillfully evade the demand.
On such an occasion as the negotiation for bridewealth, in which people intend in
advance to negotiate over the transfer of something, persistency in their demand is
clearly evident. Among the Turkana, the number of livestock paid on behalf of the
groom to the bride’s family is determined through negotiation between the sides.
The conclusion of the negotiation is always prolonged until the very day of wed-
ding, and continued down to the last single animal, while the preparations for the
wedding proceed, regardless of the state of the negotiations. In the documentary film
“Wedding Camels (McDougall & McDougall, 1976),” a negotiation in which the
parties are untiringly and patiently conducting negotiations for the privileged oppor-
tunity of transferring numerous animals is clearly depicted.
Considering “negotiation” in a general sense, such a case of negotiation, which is
oriented toward the ultimate transfer of something, is a concrete example and the
descriptions above are sufficient in this sense. However, it must be emphasized in
advance that the case of negotiation over transfer of something considered herein is
considerably different from that in our society, for example, that of a commercial
transaction. In a commercial transaction, people negotiate by focusing on estimates
of their gain and loss in a bi-directional transfer of things, an exchange of things or
that of commodities for monetary costs. By contrast, in the case outlined here, the
transfer resulting from the negotiation is one-directional. This fact is the fundamen-
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tal premise of the negotiation examined in this article.
In the one-directional case, it cannot be assumed that the participants aim solely
at the transfer of something as an outcome. This is apparent in the case of “beg-
ging,” in which the demanded stands only to lose the thing if he agrees with the beg-
gar in the negotiation. In anthropology, this is commonly thought to be related to the
notion of “reciprocity,” the belief that the one receiving a gift should in return pro-
vide the giver with something. Likewise, in the Turkana case, it is inconceivable that
the giver gives something without an expectation of a return. 
In the Turkana negotiation over transfer of something, however, their behavior is
helplessly inconsistent with what they are supposed to do in accordance with a sense
of duty concerning return, in other words, a sense of debt and the expectation of a
return. Ohta (1986), who has conducted research of the Turkana in the same area as
I have since 1978, pointed out several behavioral characteristics of Turkana negotia-
tion: (1) They never refer to the other’s past debt while participating in negotiation;
(2) Turkana adopt the attitude that they regard receipt of a present from others as a
matter of course, and never express their thanks upon receipt, in other words, they
never confirm that a debt has emerged at that time; (3) Turkana never unilaterally
provide a return gift without a request from the other; and (4) Turkana must beg to
the other even when they can expect a return gift from him. Ohta emphasized how
precarious the sense of debt is in the transfer of something among the Turkana
(Ohta, 1986).
In other words, the Turkana, at least in appearance, thoroughly neglect any sense
of debt while participating in negotiation. It may be also said that the Turkana par-
ticipate in only part of the overall negotiation, which is wholly undertaken from the
standpoint of loss and gain. Moreover, they handle their negotiations as a matter
independent from other events, in this way detaching it from both past debts
incurred by transfer of something and also future debts which will emerge as a con-
sequence of the present negotiation. As pointed out earlier, it cannot be said that
they are completely free from a sense of debt, however, their communication within
the negotiation is focused and organized on a specific point at issue regardless of
their rights and duties related to debts.
The specific point at issue about which they attempt to agree on in negotiation
and the reason why the process of communication is regarded as an independent
matter are the next questions to consider. Ohta (1986) analyzed utterances in “beg-
ging” and pointed out that beggars take the attitude that the other should agree with
their request unless he regards his relationship with them as negative, and that beg-
gars demand something in an extremely oppressive manner and appear to unilater-
ally dominate the side of the demanded. These two observation suggest that in the
negotiation over transfer of something among the Turkana, participants are not con-
cerned with consideration as to whether the requested thing should be given or not,
or which claim of the two parties, the demander and the rejecter, is just. They partic-
ipate in the negotiation on the premise that the requested thing should be given. In
consequence, they attempt, through negotiation, to come to agreement with each
other as to whether the demanded side will decide to give the thing at that point in
time or not.
In order to analyze the characteristics of communication among the Turkana peo-
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ple, I will now describe an encounter I experienced with a Turkana. A woman living
in the neighboring hamlet came to me and asked me to buy a cooking pot for her. I
declined, apologizing that I did not have enough money to do so. After repeating her
demand several times, she suddenly said, “There are two kinds of people. One kind
gives the thing requested at once, and the other puts off giving the request until
tomorrow. Which kind are you?” When I was told this, I was impressed by the gap
between the content of her statement and the fact that I had neither indicated nor
thought of buying her a pot the next day.
Upon reflection, however, the meaning of her statement is very clear. Irritated at
my response, she wanted to teach me that the only choice in Turkana negotiation is
whether the demanded decides to give the thing at that time or not, and that stating
an apology and expecting an agreement to refusing is totally irrelevant. Turkana
negotiation over the transfer of something designates not only that a request on one
side constitutes a clear starting point but also provision of the item by the other side
is a distinct and inevitable end point. This process evolves in the form of requests
followed by responses, and the entire interaction is organized as an independent
matter oriented toward its own end point, presentation of the object. 
Rephrasing this: Turkana have in advance adopted the attitude that they regard the
transfer of something among people in a friendly relationship as a matter of course.
There is, however, another principle which holds that things are never given unless
they are specifically begged for. Bodily communication for negotiation is initiated
along with the demander’s expectation and subsequent intention regarding what,
whom, when, and how to request, and this bodily communication is prolonged,
interrupted, restarted, and at some point in time, completed with a demanded’s deci-
sion as to whether to agree to the request at that time, to evade the request by way of
inserting another topic, or to reduce the request. There is, however, also the option
of prolonging the negotiation indefinitely.
These characteristics describe the Turkana framework of negotiation, a frame-
work which loosely controls the behavior of participants in communication. This
framework makes negotiation so simple and independent that each participant
attempts to agree with the other about whether or not they will realize the expected
end, the transfer of a gift, at that time and place.
An understanding of this conclusion becomes the starting point of the following
discussion. We, however, must not overlook that it is meaningful only from a view-
point in which we focus exclusively on an outcome of the interaction. We are too
used to regarding negotiation as the means to resolving a conflict of interests, or
establishing a compromise. We must keep in mind that Turkana negotiation is an
independent matter detached from any possibility of being connected to another end,
and as such, is the means to only one end, the transfer of something at that place and
time.
There is a great danger in such an understanding. Indeed, the Turkana are strongly
interested in the transfer of something as an outcome of negotiation. Moreover, they
regard the entire process of negotiation as an independent matter. As far as we main-
tain the viewpoint that focuses on an outcome of any negotiation, there remains no
answer to the question of whether a giver merely loses a thing in such a negotiation.
The only way of answering this question is to abandon our assumption that nego-
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tiation is only a means to an end. Among the Turkana, individuals participate in the
entire course of a negotiation, from start to finish, and compete with each other over
contingent consequences resulting from an accumulation of successional mutual
consents which occur in that communication. From this viewpoint, the transfer of
something is not the unique privileged purpose that governs the entire course of
communication, but only a part which arises in the last phase.
We can take such a reverse view by not separating the transfer of something from
the entire course of the communication and thus not regarding the transfer as a privi-
leged fact produced outside the communication. I, however, have no intention of
denying that people adhere to notion that the transfer of something is regarded as a
particular matter. While the Turkana do have a strong tendency to do just that, they
also regard communication for negotiation as an inevitable process undertaken for
the transfer of something on the grounds that one is never given anything unless it is
begged for, and thus regard the transfer as the last phase of, but inseparable from,
the overall communication.
In other words, among the Turkana, communicative space must be created for
negotiation before settling any conflict of interests. Participants compete with each
other in manipulating the course of the negotiation. At that time, they inevitably par-
ticipate in the entire course of the negotiation, a creative movement which pro-
gresses without interruption in accordance with the necessity inherent in the
negotiation, concluding in the transfer of something. In this sense, it is clear that the
framework at issue here yields an independent and autotelic character to the com-
munication for negotiation.
This framework doesn’t decisively affect the consequence, as is implied by the
possibility that the negotiation might be prolonged indefinitely. This framework is
important nonetheless because it gives a completely different appearance to this
communicative process. In the following section, I will analyze how Turkana initi-
ate, continue and bring to a close a negotiation based on this framework and what
experience they have through this communicative process.
MUTUAL AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION
Understanding of the Turkana cases described above is related to our conception
of the word, “negotiation.” In a practical sense, “negotiation” indicates a transaction
in which participants intend to come to mutual agreement (at least temporarily)
about settling a conflict of their interests while otherwise competing with each other.
In the context considered herein, there is an additional condition that the competitive
character of negotiation is not necessarily restricted to the case in which a conflict of
interests arises in advance of the communication.
The Turkana create a competitive circumstance by deliberately inserting their
own interests into the process of communication with others, thereby making it into
a negotiation. This does not mean that they always create trouble by expressing their
own desires straightforwardly. Instead, by making a situation a negotiation, they
explore the full potential range of mutual agreement. In this sense, they seem to be




is not only a means of resolving an existing problem.
On the other hand, regarding interaction for mutual agreement, an understanding
of the word negotiation as indicating a transaction in which each participant regu-
lates his behavior in order to maximize benefit and to minimize loss does little to
explain the Turkana cases. Moreover, it is also inappropriate to consider the condi-
tion that each participant enters into the negotiation relationship with rights and
duties, contributing the viewpoint of “reciprocity.” We should not only look at the
transfer of something as a consequence of negotiation and an emergence of debt as
its direct reflection, but also include in our scope the entire course of communication
for negotiation. In the following description, I will analyze the characteristics of
Turkana communication for negotiation, focusing on the aspect of interaction for
mutual agreement.
First of all, Turkana communication is thoroughly based on the theme of “rela-
tionship.” While I pointed out above that Turkana negotiation proceeds in the form
of a demand being followed by a response, the demand consists of asking the other
to resolve a problem concerning the demander’s own interests, or to try to involve
the other in a relationship through which the other helps them. The demander fre-
quently expresses this concretely, as in the expression, “Help me (kingarakinai) !”
In response, the demanded cannot help but agree to the relationship requested by
way of presenting a behavior directly concerning his own interests, or propose
another relationship. Which is to say, the establishment of a de facto relationship is a
direct consequence of coming to a mutual agreement through negotiation.
Although such a characteristic of communication seems to be universal because
negotiation is a universal attempt to establish a relationship in which both sides
agree with each other, among the Turkana, this comes out in a more concrete and
also, in a sense, more extreme manner. When something is demanded of one, or
even when one is only addressed, he cannot ignore the addresser. In the subsequent
process of negotiation, statements made from a third party’s viewpoint, for example
statements such as “Your demand is unfair,” “You are telling a lie,” or “You owe me
a debt,” are rigorously excluded. Eventually, all statements in the negotiation come
to focus on the relationship between participants, as exemplified by statements such
as, “Will you help me?” or “Do you respect me?”
Furthermore, Turkana negotiation is restricted to interaction in the present, in
other words, to communication at the “cooperative present.” Turkana never demand
something while referring to a past debt, which is also balanced by the fact that a
matter agreed upon in the course of or at an end of the negotiation process never
restricts future behavior. For example, there is no guarantee that the demander will
buy the medicine for which he has requested and received money. Furthermore, it is
completely improbable that the demander (now recipient) will return the money in
the case that he cannot buy the medicine. Thus, among the Turkana, the manner of
dealing with such a case would be for the demanded to buy a medicine and pass it to
the demander.
On the other hand, a demander sometimes brings up a past promise. The promise,
however, is not presumed fixed in the past and not relevant to the present negotia-
tion. By referring to a past promise, one can only reopen an interrupted negotiation.
Recall that in the Turkana mind-set, one who promises to give something tomorrow
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is the alternative to the one who gives it in the present.
Even this kind of behavior, that seems to us to be a lie or a violation of a promise
is of no matter of concern for the Turkana, who restrict their concern with experi-
ences at the “cooperative present.” There is no indication on the side of speaker that
they mind, or are even aware of any gap between their statements and any incidents
of the past or potential incidents of the future, even if, on the basis of which these
statement could be recognized as lies or a violations of a promise unless such
becomes undoubtedly clear. Turkana people, when asking someone to buy a pot for
them, may calmly state that they have no pots, even in the case that they do, but
simply not at hand. Also, the demanded dare not blame their opponent for this gap.
They never attempt to blame the other in a manner which would seem to be to their
own advantage in a negotiation, even though it seems obvious that the other has
lied. Turkana behavior does not allow for the claiming of one’s own point of justice
in referring to rules or norms which are outside of and prior to the communication at
present and thereby forcing the other to give in.
The Turkana never determine in advance, nor depend on an outside standard of
justice, by which some category of behavior can be justified or not. They are not
concerned that their actions may be considered “stealing” as long as they are not
detected. However, they readily return a “stolen” thing, should they be detected.
Further, if an owner makes a fuss about losing an item, the receiver secretly returns
it. When telling a lie that they themselves believe to be a lie, they do not think of it
as unjust, as long as they can establish mutual agreement with the other. However,
as a matter of course, they do not believe that stealing and lying are never evil.
Turkana, in advance of any communication, adopt the attitude that they can decide
whether some behavior is proper or not by virtue of whether this behavior allows
them to achieve agreement with the other.
The justification of ‘my’ behavior is in a sense proved in communication by ‘my’
taking the initiative in communication and driving the other to react in accordance
with ‘my’ claim. Turkana regard as the only basis of the justice the fact that ‘I’
make mutual agreement with others, in other words, that ‘my’ behavior is supported
by others in the communication and that ‘my’ experience becomes commonly attrib-
uted to others (Osawa, 1990).
There is an important point in reference to the connection of this second charac-
teristic to the first, that is communication with the theme of their relationship. When
we consider a “relationship,” especially a personal relationship, we tend to regard it
as a fixed status which extends over a period of time. Therefore, we are in danger of
supposing that any communication concerning their own relationship is a process of
confirming a relationship which has been fixed in the past or proposing a relation-
ship with binding force in the future. In other words, we may wrongly assume that
the communication is a process of determining their own relationship. The Turkana
do not do this. They consider a relationship to be a pattern of combining individual
behavior in a communication for negotiation and restrict themselves to interaction
about a matter of interest to both sides.
There is, therefore, a reversed logic in the view that their negotiation is a commu-
nication act with the result being that they agree with each other about creating a




some form of a relationship. Further, we should recognize that agreement to that end
has been made in advance. Realization of some relationship is already promised
whenever participants in some communication take the attitude that they will focus
on the “cooperative present.” A contingent consequence of such communication is
the realization of some relationship, and each participant competes with the other
over what it is that they come to agree on with the other.
Such a reversal corresponds directly to the case where they, in advance, take the
attitude that they regard a transfer of something as a matter of course in a negotia-
tion regarding whether they will transfer something or not. The participants always
start from a point of agreement, indeed, the most essential agreement. They have in
advance abandoned any possibility of taking a negative option in the communica-
tion, such as pretending to be unconcerned after initiating a negotiation or straight-
forwardly rejecting to offer a gift. As a number of “small” mutual consents create a
track of contingent consequences in the negotiation, the direction of the “great”
mutual agreement sooner or later becomes inevitable and unchangeable. This is
because the participants cannot, at any point in negotiation, stop and retreat from
that negotiation.
This is a consequence of the essential choice they made in advance, that of taking
the attitude of a positive participant who is willingly involved in a process of com-
munication at the “cooperative present.” Such a choice requires of them that they
abandon consideration of other contingencies and accept whatever consequence a
process of communication leads them to. Awareness that one’s own life can proceed
only by virtue of one’s own efforts has a practical significance among the Turkana.
THE DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION
Turkana negotiation is developed under two conditions as follows: 
(1) Communication for negotiation consists of the exchange of messages at a high 
degree of abstraction, concerning the relationship between participants; and 
(2) What each participant agrees to with the other at the end of the negotiation is 
left to a contingent development of the communication itself. 
In communication concerning the relationship between participants, any behavior on
various occasions may be indiscriminately made an issue of, and participants there-
fore can attempt to discover any unlimited possibilities. Communication may, there-
fore, branch off in an unexpected direction, as some other issue becomes the focus
of communication along the course of its development. The following example of
unexpected development of communication is one of the most impressive examples
I have experienced among the Turkana. The entire course of the exchange is
described in order to show this aspect of unexpectedness.
In the fall of 1992, I was in the Kakuma area of northwestern Kenya for my third
survey of Turkana. On the evening of October 1st, about twenty neighboring
inhabitants started to drink alcohol together. Lotia, the head of the family that I
depended on, being slightly drunken, instructed me to slaughter a goat, after
which the elders would do the same in turns. I was taken aback at the recklessness
????????? ?????????????????????????
of this request. I inquired about this to my assistant, whose reaction to this request
differed from his usual reaction to such requests, “I have already slaughtered one
goat for the elders at the time of my arrival. Is there something different between
that case and this one?” He said that this was the case called atukot apei, where
each member made agreed to slaughter each other’s animal in turns. I subse-
quently decided to accept this proposal.
However, as a test, I said that I had no goats. A youth named Lokikati told me
it was allowed for me to serve alcohol to drink in place of a goat, and so I agreed
to this at once. A woman selling alcohol was immediately called. However, while
this was going on, Lotia remained silent. I then criticized him for his silence on
the basis that he had proposed that feast. Soon all the other members seemed to
support my claim. After a while, Lotia’s youngest brother offered to slaughter his
own goat for that feast. Although I thought that the trouble had been settled
(because, among the Turkana, an animal of a younger sibling of a family is con-
sidered to belong to the head as well), Lotia was still keeping silent. While I
resigned myself to returning the woman who sold alcohol, Lokikati asked me to
buy alcohol for the youths, because they had cooperated with me even though
elders had not. When I hesitated for a while because other members seemed not to
be content with this proposal, a nephew of Lotia (the eldest son of Lotia’s sister,
who had returned to her parents’ home after her husband’s death) suddenly
offered his own sheep to Lotia (his animals do not belong to Lotia). This agree-
ment was then established, and we bought and drank the alcohol.
From the starting point of Lotia’s demand of a goat from me up to this point, the
communication proceeded as a series of complicated negotiations in which many
people participated on the basis of various clues. What greatly influenced the
process was a sense of the relationships which existed between me as a stranger and
them as villagers, among relatives (between brothers and between the mother’s
brother and sister’s son), and within and between age groups (between elders and
youths). It was impressive to note their determination for showing their generosity,
actions which were far from maximizing benefit and minimizing loss. In the follow-
ing description of events which occurred the next evening when we were together
eating the sheep, a conflict concerning the relationship between elders and youths
cannot help but surface.
In the evening on the next day, we were altogether drinking alcohol at the site of
preparation for eating the sheep. A group of youths, led by Lokikati, moved to a
nearby site and started dancing. After the elders and others remaining there ate a
considerable amount of the sheep, the youths returned and sat at a slight distant
from the elders. The youths complained that the sheep was too small to feed all
the members present, and the elders criticized the youths for violation of social
order based on the age group system in that they were absent and did not perform
the required service at a formal feast. Then it began to rain, and the settlement of
this dispute was postponed to the following day.
At about eight o’clock in the next morning, the elders gathered and began to
prepare for punishment, a fight called alogita, in which they used whip-like
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branches to beat the offenders. This group included the main elders of this area,
some of whom had not been present the previous night. The youths also gathered
at another place, but Lokikati, in the ranks of leader of their age group, was
absent. After more than one hour, over ten of younger members of the elders
group attacked five youths, who responded by fighting with their backs to a small
tree. At last, the older members of the elders’ group directed them to cease the
punishment.
After everything calmed down, the participants began to negotiate about the
reparation of the youths, and temporarily agreed that each of the two youths
would respectively offer a goat. The next day, they slaughtered and ate the two
goats. While Lokikati, a leader of youth group, had been totally absent during the
day, he appeared that evening, when everyone gathered for drinking. Their dis-
cussion there unexpectedly did not become that of a one-sided denunciation. Each
side respectively justified their own actions, and the meeting was over without
incident. The next day, Lokikati offered his goat for reparation without any other
punishment.
Through process described above, the series of incidents ended and never came
up after that. Nobody again brought up the agreement about atukot apei, which was
the trigger event of this affair. And nobody even slightly showed his thinking con-
cerning the nature of the relationships which contributed to the occurrence of the
incident. The negotiation indeed brought the incident to an end.
It is important for understanding the latter part of this affair to know that all of
youths who were making trouble were members of the age group called
“Ngikoripua,” who had become more influential in local political processes in recent
years. Looking at these events from the perspective of these relationships, we can
define it as an episode of youths’ challenging the process of entering the adults asso-
ciation. The young people were both provocative in these events leading to the inci-
dent from the beginning, but they also played important roles in the negotiations
which brought it to a close. One youth who offered his sheep for his uncle was also a
member of the “Ngikoripua” group.
Nevertheless, that these young people created the trouble in order to express their
challenge is not my point. They never discussed that aspect of the relationship, but
rather negotiated with the elders by bringing out the topic which directly concerned
their interests. They focused on the fact that the sheep was too small for the occa-
sion as justification for their non-attendence at the formal feast, the point upon
which the challenge of the youths could be seen as strongest. And each of these
negotiations required as its conclusion a transfer of something, an end connected
with each side’s interests. This process consequently established some relationship
as an outcome of negotiation over a matter with a conflict of interests.
Because the side which loses something positively participates in and takes initia-
tive in the very negotiation process through which it loses the thing, the negotiations
associated with these series of incidents seem to be different from the former exam-
ple of begging. With this in mind, we can readily understand what is difficult to
understand in the case of begging; that the loser seems to acquire something even
though an emergence of debt is not apparently recognized. That is the reason why
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we are convinced by the representation of these events as a “youths’ challenge.”
The question then is, what did they really obtain? And why do we consider an
occurrence of losing a thing as important? 
Beginning with the latter, although I have said that the occurrence of losing a
thing is important, I do not mean that the occurrence itself is important. Moreover,
the emergence of a debt, a direct consequence of this occurrence, is also in itself not
an important problem. If the youths’ non-participation in the feast had been recog-
nized as a mere violation of rules and they had offered animals as a compensation
for the crime, their behavior would not have been seen as a challenge. It is important
here to note that the youths were not afraid of the elders’ threats, that they fought
bravely, and that only in the end did they offer animals. Further, the elders did not
blame Lokikati for his behavior, and he as well offered his animal. In other words,
the offering of animals was considered important because it brought the negotiation
to an end after its contingent development.
The youths, therefore, did not only intend to exchange something which they had
offered for something else. If, for example, they had hesitated in offering their ani-
mals and then had given them reluctantly, their behavior would not have seemed to
be a challenge. The important point is that they brought the negotiations to an end
by seizing the opportunity at a critical moment and generously offering something.
In other words, they forced the other to react in accordance with their claim by
actively exercising their option to give a thing, and in that sense, lose it.
Let us return to the allegory. Even if the youths’ provocative demeanor was rec-
ognized as a violation of rules and was punished, we may have regarded it not as a
crime but as a youths’ challenge. We implicitly appreciate that they have their own
standard of justice which is counter to the public standard. When viewed in this
light, what the Turkana case means is extremely overt. As the relationship between
the side claiming ‘my’ justice (the youths) and the side claimed against (the elders)
is rather even, the youths can claim ‘their’ justice as based directly on ‘their’ inter-
ests and succeed in forcing the elders to react in accordance with their claim, or in a
sense, realize the relevance of ‘their’ justice.
The condition that one side in the negotiation is a youth group, therefore, is not so
decisive that it determines the process of the negotiation. Referring to this case as a
youths’ challenge is merely a means of appealing to common knowledge. Instead,
among the Turkana, this kind of a challenge is undertaken by anyone who intends to
bring a negotiation to an end in accordance with his own claim. In other words,
before we decide to represent this case merely as a youths’ challenge, we must note
the fact that such an opportunity for challenge is universal among the Turkana. In
this case, after the youths refused to participate in the feast, there was a ritualized
fight as punishment, prepared for the sole purpose of allowing the youths to negoti-
ate. The Turkana accept in advance the inevitable task of realizing ‘my’ justice, and
in so doing, prepare the opportunity for negotiation anywhere and at any time.
THE PROBLEM OF ‘MY’ JUSTICE
I have so far presented my analysis of the characteristics of communication for
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negotiation among the Turkana by focusing on determining how they participate in
the overall course of negotiation and what experience they have therein. The analy-
sis has consequently concentrated on clarifying how they perform the task of mak-
ing a compromise between two kinds of activities that have mutually conflicting
aims, activities which are selfish and oriented toward securing one’s benefits and
activities which are social and oriented toward maintaining social order by making
agreements with others.
First, I should point out the characteristic of the Turkana rejection of “anything
outside of the present communication.” Turkana regard negotiation as an indepen-
dent communication, while leaving the consequences of negotiation as part of the
communication rather than making an exception wherein the consequences are a
product which arises “outside” the communication, and in this way, they participate
in the whole course of communication while continuously producing a chain of con-
sequences. Moreover, they take the task of having ‘my’ justice be inside communi-
cation by way of making mutual agreements without depending on an “outside”
standard of justice. In conclusion, the Turkana, through independent negotiations,
attempt to have the viewpoint of ‘my’ justice be realized then and there, while they
create some relationship with the other.
The fact that each negotiation is independent and relationships and claims of ‘my’
justice are made discontinuously may give the impression that the Turkana live a
spur-of-the-moment way of life. However, a way of thinking of a stable relationship
and a fixed standard of justice are of relative importance among Turkana. This
impression can be attributed to the contrast between approaches based on estab-
lished forms and those based on emerging processes, moreover, an objective way of
knowing about something and a participant way of knowing how to relate oneself to
something.
The Turkana, through their communication for negotiation, continuously create
relationships with relative others while avoiding fixed standards of behavior. They
conduct their behavior in a manner which directly concerns either their own or their
opponent’s interests. We perform the task of establishing some relationship with an
opponent by virtue of trial and error and by knowing how to relate oneself to the
“outside” world by way of repeated self-adjustment. For example, by simple repeat-
ing an exercise, one does not come to know the nature of a flute; however, by
repeating an exercise, one can come to know what relationship one should make
with a flute to become possible to play it. In the same manner, as one learns how to
play an instrument by repeating an exercise, the Turkana learn how to negotiate
through repeated practice of negotiation process.
However odd it may at first appear, the Turkana way of communication for nego-
tiation, therefore, should be related to a generalized alternative way of knowing.
This seems to correspond to an essential way of knowing which is found in the
world of organisms when they attempt and ultimately achieve adaptation to an envi-
ronment by virtue of coming to understand the nature of the relationship that is nec-
essary to adapt to that environment. While it should be referred to as an adaptive
way of knowing, the Turkana learn this way of knowing by way of regarding com-
munication for negotiation as a whole body of interactions that continuously pro-




However, what we can understand from our viewpoint focusing on their adaptive
way of knowing is only one side of this process. Their attitude toward negotiation is
more challenging. When they find an issue concerning their own interests, they cre-
ate a competitive situation, and, so to speak, pursue something. That is the reason
why it is important to understand that they do not only make some relationship by
way of adapting to the situation, but rather they undertake the task of having ‘my’
justice be an important consideration therein.
The second characteristic I should point out is that Turkana restrict themselves to
experiences at the “cooperative present.” They begin from a point of agreement that
they are positively involved in bodily communication with each other. On the one
hand, the Turkana accept their opponent’s activeness, while on the other, they
attempt to force him to react in accordance with their demand, which is based on
their own activeness. In other words, they attempt to control the creation of the rela-
tionship to an orientation which is guided by a relative ‘my’ activeness. Given this
perspective, we can understand that their choice to restrict themselves to experience
at the “cooperative present” is the Turkana way of performing a troublesome task of
making agreement with others based on ‘myself.’
This “agreement” is not an agreement in the sense that it is made through con-
scious self-adjustment. But it is an agreement in which ‘my’ experience is attributed
not only to ‘myself’ but also to the other who confronts ‘me’ on the condition that
‘we’ restrict ‘ourselves’ to experience the communication at the “cooperative pre-
sent.” Regarding this condition, therefore, it can be said that this agreement is made
in advance. Agreement made in advance means the very fact that each side’s action
is supported by and is synchronized with the other side’s action in bodily communi-
cation. By contrast with communication made through conscious self-adjustment,
this communication corresponds to a state of mutual resonance between those par-
ticipating in a continuously created movement.
In relation to their refusal of something “outside” communication, Turkana do not
intend to make agreement by way of bringing in an “outside” standard of justice
shared by people. Moreover, they do not even search for clues to what sort of justice
they could share. Rather, they attempt to establish a standard of justice guided by
‘my’ activeness and thus produce a state of relative ‘my’ justice at that time and
place.
What the Turkana intend to do by way of making agreements based on ‘myself’ is
to effectively produce a state representing ‘my’ justice in bodily communication.
Once this kind of a pursuit begins, it cannot stop in its positive feedback circuit. The
task of producing ‘my’ justice is an individual pursuit which includes a process
incorporating a change of ‘myself’, and any reactions of others activate ‘my’ active-
ness (Bateson, 1979). That is the reason for the Turkana’s tireless activeness. On the
other hand, a claim of ‘my’ justice is put to the test of effectiveness against others’
stand, and this overall process may produce ‘our’ justice, an outcome that is
inevitably based on the others’ agreement. 
I began this article by considering bodily communication as a privileged domain
where one can experience a “cooperative present,” and, in this article, I intended to
clarify how bodily communication is connected to activities which are concerned
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with maintaining social order and securing personal benefit. It is solely by virtue of
our imprudence that we consider bodily communication only as a means of making
warm bonds between people and as a peripheral phenomenon having limited func-
tions. According to the analysis of the Turkana case herein, it is because we are
accustomed to an opportunistic way of thinking that we, on the one hand, attribute a
group of activities concerned with maintaining a social order to be institutional rules
and norms and, on the other hand, regard activities about securing personal benefit
as tactical behaviors based on calculation of loss and gain.
We are accustomed to assume that our ability of resonance with others’ bodies
and our ability of understanding based on that resonance are the essential conditions
for bodily communication. This analysis indicates that it is important to get into per-
spective not only this ability, but also this same ability oriented in the opposite
direction, that is the ability of pulling out the others’ ability of resonance. When we
exercise both of these, we are operating from the same standpoint as the Turkana in
negotiation.
How can ‘I’ positively support ‘my’ life, if ‘I’ cannot find a grounding of ‘my’
own justice residing inside ‘myself’? This analysis focused on experiences at the
present in bodily communication and clarified the importance of the viewpoint of
“body.” This “body” is not opposite to the mind, but rather inevitably connected to
the mind, the mind which attempts to confirm and justify ‘myself.’
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